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The OBJECT and the STUDY of Mathematics
Pinar Karaca
Swarthmore College
500College Ave.
Swa~hmore. PA 19081
email:pkaraca1@swarthmore.edu

This paper consists of my reflections on the object and the
study of mathematics. One of the main issues that we tried
to deal with in the 'PhiJosophy o{Math' meetings with professo r Alvin White of Harvey Mudd College was the question: " WIJQt is the object of mathematics?" This question
raisesmany relevant questions suchas:Wfwl is mathematical truth? What is thefoundation of mathematics, if there
exists one? How do weobtain mathematical knowledge? Is
the method of mathematical proof the only conceivable
method i ll mathematics? The questions above areall linked
to one another, and let ue tackle them as a whole.
As Evert W. Beth argues: "According to the current
view, mat hematics is concerned wi th imma terial objects: poin ts witho ut di mensions, lines w ith no thickness and so on."'
In other words, this common view argues that mathematics is concerned with abst ractions.

which we cannot observ e and en vision, can we still
believe that ma thematics has its fou ndations in our
real wo rld?
Putnam argues tha t mathematics d oes not have a crisis in its foundations . He does not believe tha t mathematics either has or need s foundations. In our traditiona l thinking, we ascribe prope rties such as length ,
width, thickness to material objects, and therefore,
whe n a human being thinks of a material object, she /
he directly links it with the subjective object, not a real
external object. If such objects .which we call external
objects, exist, we cannot visualize the m, but can conceive their pow ers . For example, we cannot visualize
a 'set' as we can visualize an 'apple', but w e can use
the notion of a 'set' in constructing powerful mathematical theories, and conceive the power of thi s construction, although it is not a subjective object.

The first step to obtaining ma thematical tru th is by
"Mathematics abstracts, id ealizes, sche matizes, con- obtaining mathematical kno wledge. Becau se mathstru cts, simulates.'? According to Putnam, mathemati- ema tical objects are non-ph ysical realities, the comcal truth comes from the fact that mathematics is an mon view, as Putnam points out, is that the kind of
knowled ge we have in mathematics is str ictly a pri ori.
objective science, and as he states:
H owever, Putnam also ar gues tha t mathematical
knowled ge ,in fact, resembles empirical knowledge Math ematics should be interpreted re" that is. that the criterion of truth in mathema tics just
alisti cally -that is, that mathematics
as mu ch as in physics is success of our id eas in pra cmakes asser tions that are objectiv ely
tice, and that mathem atical knowledge is corrigible
tru e or false, ind ep endently of the huand not absolute.:" Therefore, what matters in mathman m ind, an d th at something anema tical truth is the power of its non-physical realiswers to such mathematical notions as
ties in making a coherent link that is understandable
'set' and ' function'. This is not to say
by the physical wo rld . In thi s sense, mathematica l
that reality is somehow bifurcated -that
knowled ge plays an important role in mediating beis, th er e is one reali ty of mate ria l
things, and then , over and above it, a
tween the physical world and the non-physical realities of ma thematical tru th. In other word s, mathematiseco n d reality of ' ma th em a ti ca l
things'.'
cal knowledge ma kes mathematical tru th und ersta ndable by the physical wo rld .
If we accept Putnam's view on mathemati cal truth,
how can we, human beings, witnes s and fully con- Mathema tical knowledge starts with precise definiceive the found a tions of mathematics? We, human tions and auxiliary assump tions . Then, these defin ibeings, have access only to the material world. If math- tions are linked together under the assumptions, an d
ematics has a second reality of 'mathematical thin gs' theories are formed . Thomas Hobbes's definitions of
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science.in his book Leviathan, is that science is the
know led ge of consequ ences. In the light of his definition, mathematical objects are the kno wled ge of the
consequences of each link be tween given definitions,
conclusions and auxiliary assumptions.

that the mathematicians can be wrong, not in the sense
that their proofs are m islead ing, bu t that the au xiliary assumptions they use might be wrong . He believes that this flexible character of ma thematics which
allows alternatives into the field makes mathema tics

'empirical'.
What ar e the criteria for a good foundation of a mathematical theory?
1) ASSUMPTIONSMUSTBEREAUSTIC Assumptions are made
to simpl ify situation s, but they must have a large
scope . They should be bro ad enough to be applied to
mor e complicated situations.
2) DEFINITIONSMUST BESIMPLE, CLEARAND PRECISE.
3) ASSUMPTIONSANDDEFINITIONSMUSTBECONSISTENT: The
theoretician m ust use them consistently in each link
of the axiomatic structure, and newly built defini tions
must not con tradict the older ones .
4) DEFINITIONSAND EACHSTEP OFTHEAXIOMATICARGUMENT
JvfUSTBEFRUITFUL; They must enable the construction of
new definitions and new steps from them.
If these Kuhnian inspired conditions are satisfied, the

mathematical objects which are the basic ingre dients
of mathematical kno wle dge w ill be based on a strong
foundation. Theorems, propositions and so on which
will arise from this foundation will be coherent since
their bu ild up will consist of consistent link s between
the knowledge of consequences of each step we take.
As Putnam argues, generally, in empirical sciences,
for each theory, there exists other alternative theories,
or those which are stru ggling to be born. He notes:
As long as the major parts of classical
logic and number theory and analysis
have no alternatives in the field-alternatives which require a change in
the axioms and which effect the sim plicity of total science, including empi rical science, so that a choice has to
be made-the situation w ill be what it
has always been. 5
This argument suggests tha t once a theory whic h is
more powerful tha n the alrea dy existing one appears,
it is justified to accep t the new theory. Putnam believes
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His un derstanding of mathematics resembles the
Kuhnian notion of parad igms. As Kuhn su gges ts,
many different pa rad igms can exist in science. He argues that if an already existing paradigm has anoma lies, and contradictions, a new pa radigm is formed .
According to Kuhn , as long as both of the paradigms
are able to generate and solve puzzles, they are equally
adequate. It does not ha ve to be that the supporters
of the different paradigms are in disagreement. Kuhn's
paradigms are incommensur able. Similarly, Pu tnam
allows the existence of d ifferent paradigms in mathematics. An example to th is notion in mathema tics is
the non-riva l existence of bot h Euclid ean and nonEuclidean geometry.
What happens if a newly formed theory is in con tra diction with the already existing one? According to
Popper, we wo uld the n have to test the two theories
and falsify the less-satisfactory one. However, this
contradicts the notion of mathema tical truth that once
a mathematica l problem is solved, it is solved foreve r."
If a mathematical theory is formed on the bas is of the
criteria I have suggested, it is im possible that a proof
would be wrong since each knowled ge we acquire at
each step of our theory is a conseque nce of the conclusions we acquire in the preceding step. Therefore,
if it happens that a theory contradicts the other, we
might want to follow Duhem's suggestion and look
at the auxiliary assumptions we make. It might be that
our assumptions are false, or that the assumptions of
the two contradicting theories are inco mmensurable.
Having discussed the foundations of mathematical
knowledge, next we ask the question : "Once we have
all the ingredients, how can we cook our recipe to
obtain mathe matical knowledge?" As Putnam argues:
"It do es seem at firs t blush as if the sole method tha t
mathematicians do use or can use is the me thod of
mathematical proof, and as if that me thod consists
Simply in deriving conclusions from axioms which
have been fixed once and for all by ru les of derivation
which have been fixed once and for all." 7 Putnam
creates an interesting story about Marti an ma the ma t-
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ics w here Marti ans, in testing theories, use 'quasiempirica l' methods which consist of statements gen eralized by induction. This method of acquiring mathema tical knowledge creates a new concept which we
can ca ll: 'mathematical confirma tion'. Putnam argues
that our refusal to use th is 'Ma rtian' method limits
the range of our proofs to only ana lytical ones. If we
were to use quasi-empirical methods, we could also
enjoy the discovery of syn thetic truths in mathematics. Actually, when we look back at our history, we
enco unter the use of quasi -empirical methods. As
Putn am suggests, the Greeks lacked the mathematical experience and mathema tical sophistication, and
therefore , they used generaliza tions in their ma thema tical conjectures. The sim plest example is tha t the

real num bers were not introduced through a rigorous
mathematical justification . However, the use of real
numbers in mathematics now enables us to con struct
more complicated theo ries.
To conclude, mathematics is a very interesting branch
with lots of questions concern ing its origin, study,
methodology and its dir ection . It is, though. a uniqu e
branch because it is precise, objective and universal.
It does not directly conjectu re on na tu re as do the natural sciences, but it provides a lan guage and foundation on which natural sciences can base their stud ies
securely.The object of mat hematics is not a subjective
object, but one can feel its power through its preciseness, consistency and fru itfulness.

NOTES
1. Beth, pg: 25

2.ibidpg 24
3.Hilary Putnam, Mathematics. Maner and Method, Cambridge,
1975, pg: 60
4. ibid. pg 61
5. ibid. pg: 51
6. Rota. Mathematics and Philosophy
7. Putnam, pg: 61
REFERENCES

Putnam, Hilary. Mathematics. Matter and Method. Philosophical Misunderstanding. EssaysinHumanisticMathematics. MathematPapers, Volume I: ~ Mathematics without Physical Theory and ics Association ofAmerica. Washington, DC. 1993.
Experiment al Foundations".·What isMathematical Truth?· CamKuhn, Thomas. The Structure 01SCientific Revolutions. llniverbridge University Press. 1975.
Sity 01Chicago Press. 1970.
Beth, EvertW.Mathematical Thought. D. Reidel PUblishing Company. Holland. 1965
Duhem, Pierre. PhysicalTheoryand Experiment.ScientifIC KIlO"'edge: BasicIssues inthePhilosophyofScience, byJanelKourany.
Rota, Gian-Carto. The Concept of Mathematical Truth. Essays in Wadsworth Publishing Company, CA. 1987.
HumanisticMathematics. Massachusens Instituteof Technology,
Cambridge, MA.
Popper, Karl. SCience: Conjectures and Refutations. Scientific
Kno"'edge: Basic Issuesin the Philosophy of Science, by Janet
Rota, Gian-Carlo. Mathemalics and Philosophy: The story 01a Kourany. Wadsworth Publishing Company, CA 1987.

Humanistic Matlrtma tics Netuxrk: Journal#16

45

